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3EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The democratic functioning of the EU is frequently called into question. Increasingly,
the focus of this criticism is the perceived lack of legitimacy in eurozone policy-
making. The eurozone has gained a firmer grip on national policymaking in recent
years, but has not adapted its democratic structure to reflect this. To tackle this
problem, European and national policymakers have committed to improving the
eurozone’s legitimacy and accountability. One of the rare concrete proposals by poli-
cymakers is the institution of parliamentary control that deals specifically with euro-
zone matters.
This Egmont Paper examines whether it would be beneficial to have eurozone level
democracy. This is defined as parliamentary scrutiny of, by and for the eurozone. It
would deal with issues that solely concern the eurozone, and decisions would be
made solely by parliamentarians from the eurozone.
At present, eurozone level democracy does not exist. The European Parliament is
responsible for European-level democratic control of the eurozone, yet there is no
differentiation in any way between Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)
elected in eurozone countries and non-eurozone MEPs. As a result, non-eurozone
MEPs have the same powers over eurozone-specific decisions as MEPs from the
eurozone itself.
Proponents argue that eurozone level democracy makes sense because its current
absence hampers the eurozone’s legitimacy. This paper identifies three major argu-
ments in favour of eurozone level democracy:
• More parliamentary scrutiny of the eurozone is needed to counterbalance the
loss of power for national parliaments. This parliamentary control might be more
acceptable at the eurozone level than at the EU-28 level. This would be especially
true if a eurozone budget were created, as it could make eurozone level democ-
racy unavoidable.
• Policymakers insist that the level at which decisions are made should be aligned
with the level at which parliamentary control is exercised. Yet this principle is not
applied with regard to eurozone matters. Many decisions about the eurozone are
taken by eurozone countries only, while parliamentary control is organized at the
EU-28 level.
• The eurozone does not fully meet the requirements for representative democ-
racy (in which the ‘governed’ elect those who govern them). As citizens from, for
example, Denmark and the United Kingdom are in no way governed by rules that
are specific to the eurozone, it is illogical from the point of view of representative
democracy that their MEPs have a full say on eurozone matters.
THE SENSE AND NONSENSE OF EUROZONE LEVEL DEMOCRACY
4
Eurozone level democracy also has negative aspects. Indeed, there are many
grounds for dismissing it as nonsensical:
• A harmful divide could develop between the eurozone and the other Member
States. The cohesion of the EU could suffer as a consequence.
• Under the present Treaty framework, a eurozone level parliamentary body
cannot decide on EU legislation, as this is a competence of the European Parlia-
ment as a whole. Eurozone level democracy would thus most likely be limited to
non-binding issues, significantly reducing its relevance.
• Eurozone matters are not the only policy domain in which decisions taken by the
European Parliament as a whole apply to only a subset of Member States. If euro-
zone-level parliamentary scrutiny were put in place, the same set-up would argu-
ably be needed for the Banking Union, the Schengen Area, etc. This could lead to
a dysfunctional à la carte parliamentary system.
• Almost all non-eurozone Member States have an obligation to join the eurozone
in the future. As a result, the current problems with eurozone decision-making
are likely to fade away in the long run.
How could eurozone level democracy be organized in practice? Three possibilities
exist:
• A separate eurozone parliament, whose members would be elected specifically
for this parliament. While appealing at first sight, a new eurozone parliament
risks having insufficient legitimacy and/or creating excessive complexity for
voters.
• A eurozone body inside the European Parliament, with voting rights granted only
to eurozone MEPs. This approach limits complexity and ensures a link with non-
eurozone countries. At the same time, it would put pressure on the unity of the
European Parliament.
• An inter-parliamentary assembly whose membership mostly consists of national
Members of Parliament (MPs). This design would better involve national parlia-
ments in eurozone affairs, but might lack consideration for the European
perspective.
This paper argues that the European Parliament option is probably the best choice,
because it reduces the impact of some of the drawbacks associated with eurozone
level democracy. A careful design can furthermore reduce the risk of a damaging split
between eurozone and non-eurozone MEPs – even though that risk cannot be
removed completely.
Before any discussion on the precise structure, the key question is whether we actu-
ally want eurozone level democracy or not. The jury is still out, but the legitimacy of
the eurozone is too important to brush the concept of eurozone level democracy
aside without carefully considering its sense and nonsense.
5INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the EU has been labouring
to make its common currency sustainable. Following many reforms, European
control over national fiscal and economic policies has been strengthened beyond
previous expectations, and a new solidarity mechanism has been put in place. Much
of this stronger European control and solidarity concerns only the eurozone (see
Geeroms, Ide & Naert (2014) for an overview).
If stronger eurozone integration is to be acceptable, robust democratic control of its
functioning is required. In this respect, European Council President Herman Van
Rompuy (2012) was right to include ‘democratic legitimacy and accountability’ as
one of the four building blocks that are needed to move towards a genuine Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU). Numerous policymakers have joined his call to
strengthen the common currency’s legitimacy (e.g., Commission, 2012; European
Council, 2012). In addition, the rise of Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 European elec-
tions has underscored the fact that a substantial percentage of Europeans are uneasy
with the EU’s present working methods. When this public dissatisfaction and policy-
makers’ promises are combined, it is only natural that citizens expect measures to
enhance the eurozone’s democratic legitimacy.
Despite these expectations, concrete actions or proposals to achieve greater legiti-
macy remain scarce. One of the more concrete ideas is the creation of parliamentary
scrutiny dealing specifically with the eurozone. National governments have repeat-
edly advocated an exploration of this idea (Future of Europe Group, 2012; Contribu-
tion franco-allemande, 2013).
This Egmont Paper aims to do precisely this: to explore the potential usefulness of
parliamentary scrutiny at the eurozone level – eurozone level democracy, in short.
The paper starts by proposing a definition of eurozone level democracy. Subse-
quently, the soundness of the idea is analysed, by discussing its sense and its
nonsense in turns. The possible design options are discussed afterwards, as they
have an important influence on the size of the (dis)advantages of eurozone level
democracy. Finally, a conclusion is provided.
Stijn Verhelst
Senior Research Fellow
Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations 
71. WHAT IS EUROZONE LEVEL DEMOCRACY?
A definition
The concept of ‘eurozone level democracy’ requires some clarification. For this, we
can use former US President Abraham Lincoln’s famous Gettysburg Address. As the
American Civil War was raging in 1863, he stated that it was the task of the Union to
ensure that ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish
from the earth.’
Lincoln’s words remain highly relevant in Europe’s contemporary Union. Using his
dictum, we can describe eurozone level democracy as parliamentary scrutiny1 that
combines the following three characteristics:
1. scrutiny of the eurozone, i.e., dealing with the eurozone;
2. scrutiny by the eurozone, i.e., by eurozone parliamentarians;
3. scrutiny for the eurozone, i.e., for the benefit of the eurozone.
The fact that parliamentarians from the eurozone make the relevant decisions in
eurozone level democracy (scrutiny by the eurozone) is undoubtedly the most
contentious element. Some (e.g., Bertoncini, 2013) have proposed putting in place
parliamentary scrutiny that focuses specifically on the eurozone level, while not
being eurozone-specific in its decision-making. In their essence, such proposals
concern a practical reorganization of existing parliamentary control. Eurozone level
democracy as described here would go further than that, as it would modify the
essential architecture of the EU by creating a distinction between the parliamentary
control of the eurozone and that of the wider EU.
Even if parliamentarians from the eurozone are the sole decision-makers in eurozone
level democracy, this does not by definition exclude non-eurozone parliamentarians
from taking part in the process leading up to these decisions. In this sense, a distinc-
tion between decision-shaping and decision-taking is useful (Blanchet, 2013). In
eurozone level democracy, representatives from all Member States could take part
in shaping parliamentary scrutiny, but actual decisions are limited to parliamentar-
ians from the eurozone.
1 In a wider sense, eurozone level democracy can also mean, among other things, that decision-making about
the eurozone takes place at the eurozone level (which is already partially the case). This Egmont Paper,
however, focuses on the parliamentary dimension of eurozone level democracy.
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Potential tasks
Parliamentary scrutiny in eurozone level democracy could cover binding rules, as
well as non-binding matters. In terms of binding rules, passing eurozone-specific
legislative acts (directives, regulations, etc.) could be a key responsibility. Previous
examples of such eurozone-specific rules are the sanction mechanisms in the six-
pack and the budgetary reporting rules in the two-pack. However, as we will see
below, a legislative role for eurozone level democracy is highly unlikely under the
present Treaty framework.
Eurozone level democracy could, in contrast, play a role in non-binding matters even
in the short term. This could cover various aspects of the EMU’s economic govern-
ance, notably the scrutiny of eurozone institutions (e.g., the ECB, the Eurogroup,
Euro Summits). It could, in addition, deal with the annual surveillance and coordina-
tion process of national economic policymaking, which is centred on the European
Semester.
92. THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
At present, parliamentary control of the eurozone is exercised at multiple levels. At
the level of the Member States, national and regional parliaments exercise national
democratic control related to the eurozone. The European Parliament is responsible
for the European-level scrutiny of the EMU, with the Economic and Monetary Affairs
Committee (ECON) as the main committee in charge. ECON is a conventional
committee, in the sense that it does not differentiate in any way between eurozone
and non-eurozone MEPs.
In addition to national- and European-level control, inter-parliamentary cooperation
between national parliaments and the European Parliament takes place in the form
of an inter-parliamentary conference. This conference serves as a platform to
exchange views and mutual learning. It falls short of the national-level parliamentary
roles and those of the European Parliament (Kreilinger, 2013).
None of these bodies amounts to eurozone level democracy as defined above. Each
of them performs parliamentary scrutiny of the eurozone in some respect, in the
sense of dealing with eurozone matters. They do not, however, constitute scrutiny
by the eurozone, as decisions are not taken in a eurozone-specific setting. Hence,
eurozone level democracy does not exist at present.
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3. THE SENSE OF EUROZONE LEVEL DEMOCRACY
When considering the arguments in favour of introducing eurozone level democracy,
the focus is essentially put on the call for more legitimacy for the single currency. The
hope is that it would allow for better parliamentary control, and as a result help to
reduce the eurozone’s perceived democratic deficit.
More parliamentary scrutiny of the eurozone is needed
Over a short time span, Europe has acquired more competences in economic policy-
making than ever before. These increased EU powers apply for the most part to the
countries in the eurozone, as they face tougher surveillance, stricter fiscal targets
and more sanctions in case of non-compliance than their counterparts outside the
single currency area. This increased European control has reduced the leeway of
governments and parliaments in eurozone countries in their fiscal and economic
policy decisions. An important example of the reduced leeway for national parlia-
ments is the fact that national budgets are now, in practice, first sent to the EU,
before being discussed at the national level (Maduro, 2012).
The reduced role of national parliaments has not been compensated by an increase
in parliamentary activity at the European level. The competences of the European
Parliament have simply not kept pace with the European economic integration that
has taken place since the eurozone sovereign debt crisis started. The Parliament’s
role is limited with regard to the annual surveillance and coordination of national
economic policymaking, including the European semester. Furthermore, the Parlia-
ment has been sidestepped on several occasions as co-legislator by means of inter-
governmental treaties among Member States (the Fiscal Compact, the European
Stability Mechanism or ESM and the Single Resolution Fund) (Hallerberg et al., 2011;
Fasone, 2014).
Despite this closer European economic integration, the EMU remains an unfinished
project. In key reports about the future of the EMU, substantial additional reforms
are advocated (e.g., Commission, 2012; Enderlein & Bofinger, 2012; Van Rompuy,
2012). The proposed reforms would entail a higher involvement of the European
level in economic decision-making. Importantly, some form of a eurozone budget is
frequently called for. If such a budget resulted in the pooling of eurozone resources,
and was unaccompanied by eurozone level democracy, the American revolutionary
slogan of ‘no taxation without representation’ would spring to mind. For this reason
many believe that eurozone level democracy will have to accompany major leaps in
eurozone integration (Maurer, 2013).
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The widening gap between increased eurozone competences and lagging European
democratic control leads to calls to increase the parliamentary control of the euro-
zone. Such stronger parliamentary scrutiny does not necessarily have to be exercised
at the eurozone level though, as national- or European Parliament are other poten-
tial options.
Even so, it might prove politically more acceptable for national governments to leave
the surveillance of eurozone matters to the eurozone level, rather than an EU-wide
body. The ESM is a key example of a body where European level parliamentary
control is missing. If a eurozone-level parliamentary body had existed, eurozone
countries might have endowed this eurozone body with relevant supervisory tasks
(although this remains wild speculation, of course). From the EU perspective, fully
national control also raises difficulties, as it could lack a transnational view. Eurozone
level democracy could be the potential compromise that is acceptable from both a
national and a European point of view.
Scrutiny at the decision-making level
While the need for more scrutiny of the eurozone does not necessarily imply euro-
zone level democracy, EU policymakers have indirectly indicated their preference for
democratic control at this level. When discussing the EMU’s reforms, the EU institu-
tions repeatedly stressed that democratic legitimacy and accountability are to occur
at the level at which decisions are taken (European Commission, 2012; European
Council, 2012; European Parliament, 2013). Although this principle is evoked
frequently, it is in fact not consistently applied in practice with regard to the euro-
zone.
Many eurozone-related decisions are taken at the level of the eurozone. In terms of
formal decision-making, monetary policy by the European Central Bank and deci-
sions by the ESM stand out as clear-cut examples of eurozone level decision-making.
In addition, most Council decisions about eurozone matters occur informally in the
Eurogroup, where only countries using the single currency are present. If needed,
formal Council decisions that solely apply to the eurozone can also be taken by euro-
zone countries only.2 Eurozone heads of state and government for their part meet
and decide at the level of the eurozone during Euro Summits.
This formal and informal eurozone-level decision-making is in stark contrast to the
lack of eurozone-level parliamentary scrutiny. If EU policymakers are to live up to
their commitment to organize democratic legitimacy and accountability at the level
where decisions are made, this points towards a need for eurozone level democracy
– informally at the very least.
2 Article 136(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
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Ensuring representative democracy
The most fundamental argument in favour of eurozone level democracy is that the
current scrutiny architecture does not meet the requirements of representative
democracy. This contrasts with the EU Treaties,3 which state that representative
democracy is to be the foundation of the EU’s functioning (Goulard & Monti, 2012).
In his reference work, Heywood (2002, p.70) describes the key characteristic of
representative democracy as the fact that ‘[t]he public do not exercise powers them-
selves; they merely select those who will rule on their behalf.’ He adds that, as a
result, ‘[t]his form of rule is democratic insofar as representation establishes a reli-
able and effective link between the government and the governed.’ Hence, the
people (i.e., ‘the governed’) elect those who govern them.
The key difficulty lies in defining ‘the people’, or as Jennings (1956, p.56) puts it:
‘[t]he people cannot decide until someone decides who are the people.’ In what
follows, we will use a somewhat rough conception of ‘the people’ as those who are
affected by the relevant rules (see Miller, 2009 and Scherz, 2013 for a more detailed
discussion). Based on this conception, EU citizens can be subdivided into three
groups when it comes to eurozone-specific decisions and the role their representa-
tives should have in making these decisions:
1. Citizens of eurozone Member States. These citizens are fully subject to eurozone
rules – both normal eurozone legislation and decisions that are part of the annual
economic surveillance and coordination process (comprising the European
Semester). It is obvious that these citizens’ representatives should have a full say
in decision-making about the eurozone.
2. Citizens of ‘pre-in’ Member States. This group comprises citizens in non-euro-
zone Member States that have a legal obligation to join the eurozone in the
future when they are deemed to have met entry conditions (hence ‘pre-in’).
These citizens will be subjected to eurozone-specific legislation at some point in
the future. Hence it seems fair to include their representatives in decision-making
on these rules.
Eurozone decisions that are part of the annual economic surveillance and coordi-
nation are a different story. These decisions are only relevant for countries that
are part of the eurozone at the time they are adopted. As a result, these decisions
do not bind pre-in Member States, so it would be peculiar to count citizens from
pre-in Member States among those citizens genuinely affected by annual euro-
zone level economic surveillance and coordination decisions.
3. Citizens from ‘opt-out’ Member States. Opt-out Member States have no obliga-
tion to join the eurozone. Denmark and the United Kingdom have both formally
opted out of joining the common currency, and Sweden has managed to obtain
3 Article 10(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
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an exemption de facto. Citizens from these countries are in no way subject to
eurozone level legislation nor to eurozone economic surveillance and coordina-
tion decisions. It is thus wrong to include citizens from these countries among
those that are being governed by rules concerning only the eurozone.
Notwithstanding the fact that not all EU citizens are subject to eurozone-specific
decisions, all MEPs have an equal say when voting on them. As a practical result,
MEPs from opt-out countries carry more weight in eurozone legislative decision-
making than the MEPs from the ten least-populated eurozone countries combined.4
This mismatch between those who are governed by eurozone level rules and those
who decide on these rules raises questions about the democratic legitimacy of the
current arrangements (Tuori, 2014).
Similar issues with representative democracy have been raised elsewhere. In the
United Kingdom, the devolution of powers has led to questions as to whether MPs
from, for example, Scotland, should have a right to vote in the UK parliament on rules
that do not apply to their constituency (the ‘West Lothian question’). After agreeing
to more powers for Scotland following its September 2014 referendum on independ-
ence, British Prime Minister David Cameron called for ‘English votes for English laws’
(Cameron, 2014). In terms of the representative democracy for the eurozone, this
would translate as ‘eurozone votes for eurozone decisions.’
4 In the 2014-2019 European Parliament, Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom have 106 MEPs. The ten
least-populated eurozone countries combined (Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia) only have 95 MEPs. In total, countries from the eurozone elect 64% of
the MEPs, pre-ins 22% and opt-outs 14% (own calculations).
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4. THE NONSENSE OF EUROZONE LEVEL 
DEMOCRACY
While the earlier arguments in this paper plead in favour of eurozone level democ-
racy, counterarguments shed a different light on its usefulness. These flip-side argu-
ments mainly relate to legal difficulties and the threat to the unity of the EU.
No need to split the eurozone ins and outs
The creation of eurozone level democracy would, by definition, differentiate
between eurozone Member States and non-eurozone Member States. This division
already exists, but would be exacerbated. There is a risk that a deeper eurozone/non-
eurozone split would be detrimental for the political unity of the EU. The possible
advantages of eurozone level democracy might then be dwarfed by the disadvan-
tages, leading to the diminished cohesion of the Union.
Furthermore, from a legal point of view, there is no apparent need to put in place
eurozone level democracy. The Treaties state that ‘the Union shall establish an
economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro.’5 Thus the euro is the
currency of the Union as a whole – even if used only by a subset of its Member States.
Given that the European Parliament is the parliament of the EU, it is fully natural that
it deals with matters concerning the euro. As the Parliament sums it up: ‘the currency
of the Union is the euro and its parliament is the European Parliament’ (European
Parliament, 2012).
Additionally, MEPs are, legally speaking, not representatives of the Member State
where they were elected.6 As members of a supranational body, MEPs are meant to
consider the interests of all EU citizens. A British or Danish MEP is meant to be as
committed to the euro’s wellbeing as an MEP from the eurozone. From this point of
view, all MEPs can and should be fully involved on decisions concerning the euro.
Nevertheless, political realities ought not to be overlooked: the nationality of an MEP
does matter in practice (see Piris, 2012; Dehousse, 2013).
No legislative role for eurozone level democracy
As co-legislators, the Council and the European Parliament decide together on EU
legislation, including legislation that exclusively focuses on the eurozone. Under the
present Treaties, the Parliament as a whole votes on EU rules: it is not possible to
5 Article 3 TEU.
6 In this sense, Article 10 TEU states that ‘citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European
Parliament.’
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differentiate between eurozone and non-eurozone MEPs when it comes to legally
binding votes (Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, 2011). The Treaties would have to be revised
in order to modify these voting rules – not a short-term prospect.
The fact that voting on EU legislation is a responsibility of the Parliament as a whole
seriously limits the possible scope of eurozone level democracy. Eurozone level legis-
lation that bypasses the EU framework could be envisaged, in line with previous
intergovernmental agreements between eurozone countries (e.g., the ESM). Such an
approach comes, however, with several difficulties of its own: the eurozone legisla-
tion would not be able to modify EU rules, and reliance on EU institutions would be
cumbersome (de Gregorio Merino, 2013).
Thus, in the present Treaty framework, eurozone level democracy would most likely
have to be limited to non-legislative tasks. As mentioned above, this can entail the
scrutiny of eurozone institutions, as well as the annual economic surveillance and
coordination process. It is worth asking whether eurozone level democracy would be
of sufficient added value in this scenario. This is all the more true given the fact that
the Parliament’s current role in annual economic surveillance and coordination is
humble, to put it mildly. If eurozone level democracy were put in place, it arguably
ought to have a bigger say in eurozone surveillance and coordination than is
currently the case for the Parliament.
Even if it were possible to change the EU Treaties, it is doubtful whether the decision-
making rules in the Parliament should be modified to allow for binding eurozone-
level legislative decision-making. As noted earlier, eurozone-level legislation eventu-
ally becomes binding for all Member States that have a legal obligation to join the
eurozone. This endorses the proposal that MEPs from these Member States are
allowed to vote on eurozone level legislation. Following this logic, only MEPs from
Denmark, the United Kingdom and (possibly) Sweden would be excluded from euro-
zone-level legislative decision-making.
The risk of an à la carte parliamentary system
The euro is far from the sole issue where the European Parliament as a whole decides
on matters that concern only a subset of the EU. The application of European rules is
in practice often limited to a subset of Member States due to practical and geograph-
ical reasons. Rules on mountainous regions, for example, obviously only apply to
Member States with mountains, excluding countries like Denmark and the Nether-
lands. Similarly, rules on maritime fishing do not apply to landlocked Member States,
like Austria or Hungary. Yet in the Parliament, MEPs from these countries have as
much of a say in these matters as any other MEP (Duff, 2012).
While the above is a useful debate point, it needs to be put into perspective. Coun-
tries like Denmark and the Netherlands did not choose to be deprived of mountains,
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nor did Austria or Hungary want to be landlocked. In contrast, Denmark, the United
Kingdom and Sweden independently decided to retain their own currency when
offered the possibility of joining the euro. The comparison to mountainous regions
would only be fully accurate if a country with mountains decided not to apply the
European rules on the matter – while nonetheless keeping the right to vote on the
rules applying to others.
A more relevant reason to expand this discussion beyond the euro question stems
from the fact that the common currency is only one element in an expanding set of
differentiated integration in Europe. The Schengen Area, the unified patent, divorce
law, the Banking Union and judicial cooperation are other fields in which only a
subset of Member States participate (Lepoivre and Verhelst, 2013). In all of these
fields, votes are cast by all MEPs, irrespective of whether or not they participate in
the differentiated integration at stake. If specific decision-making is put in place for
the eurozone, this should, arguably, also be done for the other fields of differentiated
integration. Thus a multitude of parliamentary bodies would need to be created. This
risks a dysfunctional à la carte parliamentary system (Fasone, 2014).
The problem will mostly solve itself
The final argument against eurozone level democracy concerns the gradual increase
in the eurozone’s membership. As almost all non-eurozone Member States have an
obligation to join the common currency, the gap between the eurozone and the EU
should close in the future. In the long run, all pre-in Member States will become part
of the eurozone. In such a scenario, only the opt-outs – a handful of Member States –
will not be part of the eurozone. This would vastly reduce the problems linked to the
absence of eurozone level democracy.
Even in the case of the opt-out Member States, possible shifts might in the future
align the eurozone’s membership more closely with that of the EU. If the euro proves
to be a robust currency, Denmark and Sweden could eventually decide to abandon
their own currency. For the United Kingdom, the reverse is possible, as its exit from
the EU is conceivable. As Britain is the biggest Member State with an opt-out, its exit
would substantially alter the balance between the eurozone’s ins and outs.
The key caveat to this line of reasoning is the time it will take before nearly all EU
Member States are incorporated into the eurozone. Following the eurozone crisis,
non-eurozone Member States have become more reserved about the prospect of
joining the common currency. In addition, new Member States will continue to join
the EU – for instance, the Balkan countries. It will be a considerable time before these
future Member States are ready to join the eurozone. Thus the eurozone-EU gap will
most likely only become negligible in the very long run. And, as Keynes (1923)
famously phrased it, ‘this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long
run we are all dead.’
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5. THE POSSIBLE DESIGNS OF EUROZONE LEVEL 
DEMOCRACY
In assessing the potential usefulness of eurozone level democracy, it is important to
consider its practical design options. In essence, eurozone level democracy can be
organized through three different routes: the eurozone, the EU or the national-based
route. Each of these options has its own influence on the relative importance of the
advantages and disadvantages discussed above.
The eurozone route: a separate eurozone parliament
The most straightforward approach to setting up eurozone level democracy would
be to create a new parliament at that level (Meyer, 2012). Despite its apparent
simplicity, this approach raises certain difficulties with regard to this hypothetical
parliament’s composition.
For it to be genuinely a eurozone parliament, the assembly should neither be domi-
nated by MEPs nor by national MPs. Otherwise, the eurozone parliament itself would
in practice be organized through either the EU or the national route discussed below.
The members of the eurozone parliament should hence be elected, either in an indi-
rect or a direct manner.
The indirect election of members of this notional eurozone parliament by national
governments or EU institutions would seriously hamper the legitimacy of that parlia-
ment. It is hard to see how parliamentarians appointed in this way could be
perceived as more legitimate than directly elected MEPs and national MPs.
If eurozone parliamentarians were directly elected, citizens would have to fill in a
separate ballot when the European elections took place. This risks reinforcing the
image of an overly complex EU, and might in the end be counterproductive for the
EU’s legitimacy (Piris, 2012; Beneš & Braun, 2014). As a result of these weaknesses,
a new eurozone parliament does not seem to be the best possible design for euro-
zone level democracy.
The EU route: inside the European Parliament
A second, more realistic design option is to organize eurozone level democracy inside
the European Parliament (Goulard & Monti, 2012; Glienicker Group, 2013). In this
scenario, a committee (or subcommittee) that deals with eurozone matters would be
created in addition to the existing committees. Potentially, a plenary for the euro-
zone could also be foreseen in the Parliament, although it would lack legislative
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powers in the current legal setting. The eurozone committee and/or plenary would
have to differentiate between the voting rights of eurozone and non-eurozone MEPs
in order to genuinely allow scrutiny by the eurozone.
The advantage of this scenario is that it limits the problem of an à la carte parliamen-
tary system. The same special committee could also deal with other forms of differ-
entiated economic integration (notably the Banking Union). If the differentiation in
parliamentary control were extended beyond economic matters, this supervision
could still take place inside the Parliament through the creation of additional
committees. Flexible composition of the Parliament’s plenary is also conceivable.
This approach has a further advantage: being organised in an EU-wide body, it
ensures a close link with the other EU Member States. MEPs are – finally – well-
informed about the EU’s functioning, which will remain crucial even in eurozone level
democracy.
However, the creation of a separate eurozone committee and/or plenary in the
Parliament also comes with disadvantages. Most importantly, it risks creating a split
in the Parliament between the ins and the outs of closer integration. The Parliament
is currently a unitary institution in which all MEPs have the same rights, serving as a
bridge overcoming specific national interests (Gostyńska & von Ondarza, 2012). A
eurozone committee would inevitably change the Parliament’s dynamic. A careful
design could potentially limit the damage, but the risk of a harmful split remains.
Some argue in addition that it would legally simply not be possible to make a distinc-
tion between eurozone and non-eurozone MEPs. But this is an overly narrow inter-
pretation of the EU’s rules. In essence, the hurdle to a eurozone committee in the
Parliament is not legal in nature, but political (Verhelst, 2014).
The national route: an inter-parliamentary assembly
The final possible route for the creation of eurozone level democracy relies on
national parliaments. In this scenario, an inter-parliamentary eurozone assembly in
which national MPs meet would be established. Several authors have proposed this
kind of national-based approach to eurozone democracy (Piris, 2012; Legrain, 2014;
Pisani-Ferry, 2014). This inter-parliamentary eurozone assembly could be created by
upgrading the existing inter-parliamentary conference on EMU (see above). The
assembly would meet more frequently, and should have increased competences to
carry out eurozone scrutiny. Finally, voting rights would have to be limited to
national MPs from the eurozone.
A key advantage of this option is that it would help increase the involvement of
national parliaments in the eurozone’s functioning. However, potential dangers also
loom. A Member State-based route would notably go against the trend towards
organizing EU parliamentary control at the transnational level. Part of the super-
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vision of eurozone matters would then be reverted from the European to the
national level. It is questionable whether national MPs would be able to consider the
eurozone issues from a European point of view, rather than through their customary
national lenses. While more national scrutiny of the eurozone is, of course, to be
applauded, it should arguably not come at the expense of the role of the European
level (Goulard & Monti, 2012).
MEPs could potentially be members of such an inter-parliamentary assembly,
reducing the assembly’s national bias. Yet MEPs would, almost by definition, be in
the minority. The reason for this is that delegations from national parliaments would
have to reflect the diversity of political views in each Member State (i.e., at least two
MPs from each country) and at the same time have a degree of proportionality with
regard to the Member States’ population size (i.e., more MPs from large countries).
The German Constitutional Court notably insisted on the latter, which renders it
unlikely that a eurozone parliamentary body could be less proportionate than the
European Parliament.
The result is a substantial number of national MPs in the inter-parliamentary
assembly, outnumbering the eurozone MEPs that deal with EMU matters.7 There-
fore, an inter-parliamentary assembly is destined to follow a national route towards
eurozone level democracy (Mauer, 2013).
7 Roth (2011) has made a proposal for a eurozone parliament with 300 parliamentarians, of which half would
come from the European Parliament and half from national parliaments. But even 150 national MPs might
not allow for sufficient diversity along political views and Member States’ population, and would at the
same time outnumber MEPs dealing with EMU matters.
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CONCLUSION
The potential creation of eurozone level democracy remains a contentious matter.
As this paper makes clear, the concept contains both sense and nonsense. The very
real calls for greater legitimacy are the essential drivers in favour of eurozone level
democracy. In contrast, for practical and legal reasons, eurozone level democracy
could have little added value, and even risks being counterproductive. Furthermore,
there is the major risk that it could lead to a widening of the division between the
eurozone and the other Member States.
It is important to bear in mind that, despite the potential disadvantages, eurozone
level democracy might in the future become indispensable if the eurozone sets up its
own budget. Without eurozone level democracy, the legitimacy of that budget – and
of the eurozone – would be in serious peril.
If eurozone level democracy were considered, there are strong arguments in favour
of organizing it within the European Parliament: additional forms of differentiated
parliamentary control would be manageable and non-eurozone MEPs could be
included in the decision-shaping. The downside is that the approach risks under-
mining the unity of the Parliament. A careful design could reduce this problem, but
cannot make it disappear. Yet this downside should be compared to the disadvan-
tages of the alternative forms of eurozone level democracy. These alternatives could
fall victim to excessive complexity and/or a neglect of the transnational interests of
the eurozone.
In any case, we should not expect miracles to result from eurozone level democracy.
It would most likely not influence the citizens’ perception of their voice in eurozone
decision-making in a major way, nor would it necessarily lead to better output from
the eurozone. Eurozone level democracy does have the more limited potential to
enhance the EU’s internal governance (or ‘throughput’ as Schmidt (2013) calls it),
which might in turn help improve the EU’s overall legitimacy. Because of this poten-
tial, it is this author’s humble opinion that the idea of eurozone level democracy is
too important to be dismissed out of hand.
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